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NOTES
THE USE OF THE INJTUNCTION TO PREVENT CRIMhE*
In this paper the writer will attempt, first, to give something of the history of Equity and its jurisdiction, showing how
Equity, at one time, exercised a criminal jurisdiction and later
relinquished it, and second, how the general rule has become
well established that a court of equity is not a court of criminal
jurisdiction.
After this consideration of the historical growth of the
equity court, we shall briefly consider the question: does the
fact that the criminal law is not enforced give sufficient ground
for a court of equity to intervene and enjoin the connmision of
crime ?
A court of equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction,
but lest there be a misinterpretation of this statement, the writer
wishes to make clear that there should be made a qualification
of this statement, and a more accurate statement of the rule is
that a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to enjoin criminal acts as such.
This qualification is necessary because courts of equity do
in fact enjoin acts which are crimes. But this jurisdiction is
not founded and is never exercised because the acts enjoined
are crimes, but because they would result in irreparable injury
to property, or because they are public nuisances affecting the
health, safety, or morals of the community, and against which
the remedy at law is inadequate.
It is true that there has been in recent years a marked
growth in the law, and the jurisdiction of courts of equity in
some cases has been founded by a looser construction of the
established principles, such as public nuisances, and there has
been a different interpretation placed on the requirement that
the remedy at law must be inadequate, which has been much
more favorable to the jurisdiction of the equity court.
However, the writer believes that there has been no direct
departure from the established principles governing equity
*This is the first of a series of notes to be published under the
same general heading.
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jurisdiction. So, with this qualification, that is, that a court
of equity cannot enjoin crimes as such, the established rule that
a court of equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction will be
found to hold true.
As the purpose of this note is chiedly to give some insight
into the origin of equity and the growth of its jurisdiction as it
is today, let us proceed to a study of the history of equity.
Equity has been defined as that system of justice which was
administered by the High Court of Chancery in England in
the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.1 In order to
understand what equity is it is necessary to understand what
the English High Court of Chancery was and how it came to
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction.
After the Norman Conquest, the local tribunals which were
already in existence were retained, but the supreme judicial
authority was vested in the king, assisted by his councils.
The king had two councils. The great council later became
the parliament, and it consisted of the bishops, earls, barons,
and such knights as held lands directly from the king. There
was no sharp line drawn between executive and judicial functions, and the great council was in both branches an advisory
rather than a potential body. The small, or ordinary, council
advised the king during the intervals when the great council was
not in session, and it appears to have formed part of the great
council when in session. 2
The king was the source of all power and all justice
emanated from the crown. The king, in theory and perhaps in
fact, enacted laws and redressed particular grievances.
The ordinary council was composed of barons chosen by
the king, and certain officers of the palace, and to these there
were added persons learned in the law, styled justiciarii,
together with others sometimes specially summoned by writ from
the chancellor's office. 3
The theory was that all power and justice was vested in the
king. The council'was the great judicial center of the kingdom,
and from it all justice emanated. The supreme authority, including the supreme judicial power, was vested in this council. The
king sometimes sat in person with this council, together with the
11Bispham: Principles of Equity, p. 1.
21 Spence: Equity 329.
'Ibid. 107; 1 Foss' His., Judges 9.
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chief justiciary and the chancellor, attending to complaints and
grievances.
This small'council was called the Curia Regis, and it
appears to have become in the reign of Henry I, the court of
ultimate appeal from all the courts of ordinary jurisdiction.
Out of this council, or Royal Court, the Court of King's Bench,
the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas
gradually arose.4
We now come to the position of the Chancellor in the system.
Blackstone said the chancery derived its name from that of its
presiding officer, the chancellor, who was so called because he
cancelled the king's letters patent when issued contrary to law.
He was an officer of great distinction, and the office may be
traced back to the Saxon Kings, many of whom had their
chancellors. 5
The chancellor was secretary to the king and keeper of the
king's Great Seal. He was a member of the council as the
keeper of the Great Seal and personal advisor of the king. We
shall see that he held a very close connection with both the
king and the law courts. The beginning of the chancery as a
separate department of the government dates from 1238 when
Henry the Third dispensed with baronial chancellors, holding
office for life, and took the office into his own hands. He
appointed his chancellor, and started the system of taking the
profits of the seal for the use of the crown and paying the
chancellor a fixed sum for the maintenance of a body of clerks
who served under him. 6
As keeper of the Great Seal, the chancellor was destined to
become much more than a mere departmental chief, for it put
him at the head of the entire English legal system. He exercised
the power to cancel the king's letters patent when issued contrary to law, and he had supervision over all public letters,
charters, and other instruments passing under the Great Seal.
The power of the chancellor which was of the utmost
importance was the power to issue original writs. The English
legal system was a system of royal justice, and before any suit
could be brought in the king's courts, the suitor had to get a
writ, authorizing him to bring his suit. This was issued out of
4

Bispham's Principles of Equity, 9th Edit. p. 5.
'3 Blackstone 45.
OHoldsworth: Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. 1, p. 395.
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the chancery, and was sealed by the chancellor. The power of
the chancellor as keeper of the Great Seal and the power to
issue writs constituted the ordinary jurisdiction of the chancellor, or chancery department. But the function of the chancellor as keeper of the king's conscience was what constituted
his extraordinary jurisdiction.
As the king's council still retained its general supreme
authority, applications for relief were frequently made to that
body when for any reason redress could not be otherwise
obtained. These petitions were made to the king's conscience,
and in considering them the advice of the chancellor was usually
followed or they were left entirely for his disposal.7
As it was the duty of the chancellor to issue original writs,
it was he who passed on the question of whether the case presented came under one of the writs in use or whether it would
call for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction held in
reserve. This extraordinary jurisdiction included cases for
which there was no writ in use and other cases in which the
remedy in the courts of common law was for any reason
inadequate. 8
This extraordinary jurisdiction was likely to increase
because of the fixed forms of action, the tendency of the common
law courts to hold rigidly to precedent, and the refusal of the
common law courts to adopt equitable principles and remedies.
Also, the ambitions of the chancellors led them to give redress
by exercising this extraordinary jurisdiction, which they exercised as a royal prerogative for the king, rather than by directing a writ to be issued to bring the cause before the ordinary
tribunals.9
Thus, by this power to issue original writs, the chancellor
became very powerful. But the rising power of Parliament in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries began to fetter this
power of the chancellor. The forms of action in use did not
cover the cases in which the plaintiff suffered indirect or consequential injury from the acts of the defendant, and, too, the
barons did not favor the extensive exercise of the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the chancellor; they passed the Statute of Westminster II in 1285, which gave the chancellor the power and
T Bispham's

Prin. of Equity, 9th Edit. p. 8.
zBispham's Prin. of Equity, 9th Edit. p. 8; 1 Spence Equity, 330.
' Bispham's Prin. of Equity, 9th Edit. p. 9.
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authorized him to vary slightly the forms of actions in order
that justice might be rendered in similar cases in the courts of
common law, aid as a result of this statute came the writ of
trespass on the case.
The power to issue original writs tended to become ministerial as Parliament and the law courts became stronger, but the
chancellor continued to exercise the royal right to administer
equity when for any reason the petitioner could not get an
adequate remedy in the courts of common law. These matters
were conisdered as matters of favor and not of right, and they
came to be known as matters to be granted as of grace. Until
the latter half of the thirteenth centry the chancellor was considered as acting under and following the king and merely
exercising a royal prerogative for the king, acting merely as the
king's advisor and personal agent; but the Ordinance of 128010
provided that all petitions which involved the issuance of any
document or writ under the Great Seal should go first to the
chancellor. A still better recognition of the chancellor as the
proper person to administer the extraordinary jurisdiction in
matters of grace is contained in a proclamation of Edward the
Third to the sheriff of London, which provided that petitions
relating to the grant of the king's grace should be brought
before the chancellor or the keeper of the Privy Seal, and not
to the king in person.1 1 Several other statutes of the reign of
Edward the Third gave jurisdiction over specified matters to
the chancellor. The chancellors without hesitancy exercised their
powers to protect persons and property from violence, and their
powers were extended by Edward the Third, who authorized
12
them to protect the poor and the weak.
Because of the close relation and connection of the chancellor with the king, the council, and the common law courts,
he was able to give any relief needed, and in 1340 the Chancery
13
is mentioned as a court along with the courts of common law.
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the chancery was
becoming a well established court with its jurisdiction fairly
well settled. Some matters were referred to the chancery by the
parliament and the council. The chancellor was not only the
10Stat. 8 Edw. 1st. 1280.
Stat. 22 Edward 3rd. 1348; Bispham: Prin. of Equity, 9th Edit.
p. 11.
"Mack: Revival of Criminal Equity. 16 tIarv. L. Rev. 390.
"1Stat. 14 Edw. 111, 1340.
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head of the chancery, but he was also a member of the council,
and he very often presided over the council when complaints
were heard before it. He had long been a powerful officer, but
did not become the head of an independent court of chancery
until the end of the fifteenth century.
However, because the chancery had become, by the end of
the fifteenth century, an independent court with its jurisdiction
fairly well settled must not be taken to mean that the powers of
the chancellor were greater than ever; on the contrary, we shall
see that by this time the scope of his jurisdiction was considerably limited. It was becoming possible to classify the various
cases which came before the chancellor and the council rather
than before the courts of common law.' 4 They are as follows:
(a) cases which fell altogether outside the common law, such
as cases concerning alien merchants, and cases of Maritime or
Ecclesiastical law, (b) when the common law afforded a remedy,
but the plaintiff could not get relief or the courts could not
enforce their remedies because of the power of the defendant,
and (c) cases in which the law itself was in fault and afforded
no remedy.
Through the Middle Ages, the weakness of the government,
the turbulence of the times, and the power of strong defendants
was the ground for the interference of the chancellor as much
as the strictness and inadequacy of the law. 15
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, which was supported by
the kings of that period, especially by Edward the Third and
Richard the Second, the chancellor protected property from
violence and gave relief to the poor and the weak, and, in so
doing, the chancellor enjoined many criminal acts. Many of
these cases were cases of maitnenance, assaults, trespasses, and
a variety of outrages which were cognizable at common law,
but for which the petitioner could not get relief in the common
law courts. This jurisdiction was exercised because of the
inability of the law courts to give relief due to the exigencies
of the times. 16
In the later years of the reign of Edward the Fourth, in
the latter half of the fifteenth century, the jurisdiction of the
council was revived after the War of the Roses, and it began
14

Holdsworth: History of English Law, Vol. 1, p. 405.
Note 14.
Bispham's Prin. of Equity, 9th Edit. p. 12.

18Supra,

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

the state, and left to
to hear criminal cases affecting the peace of
1
the chancery jurisdiction over civil cases. 7
In 1486, the judicial powers of the council came to be
exercised by the Court of Star Chamber, established in that
year.'8 It tended to become a court of criminal equity, and the
council became an executive body.' 9 The statute establishing
the court cites as premises that by unlawful maintenances and
briberies, and for other reasons, the policy and good rule of
the realm were almost subdued, and that crimes were increasing.
The Act then provided for the organization of the court, making the chancellor a member.
Thus, we have, by the end of the fifteenth century, the
chancery as a separate and well established court of equity with
the civil law as the basis of its jurisdiction. However, the
chancellor was also a member of the Court of the Star Chamber,
which exercised a criminal jurisdiction. The statute creating
the court gave it the authority to call persons before it on bill
or information put to the chancellor or the king, and such as
they found guilty to punish according to the form and effect
of the statutes as if they had been convicted by due order of
2
the law. 6
In 1640 this court was by statute abolished, and the statute
provided a penalty for any chancellor, lord councillor, or judge
to exercise any such powers. The reasons cited for the abolition
of this court were that it had overstepped its powers, that those
matters had their redress in the common law of the land, that
the reasons for the continuance of the court had ceased, and
that it was a means to introduce an arbitrary power and government.2 1 These reasons cited in the statute reflect the popular
feeling of the times, and indicate the growing power of constitutional government in England.
After the fifteenth century, the incompetence of the criminal law as a ground for the interposition of equity was wiped
away. But the court never ceased to assert its right to protect
property from irreparable injury, even if the act involved were
also a crime. 22
1

Holdsworth: His. of Eng. Law, Vol. 1, p. 408.

18Stat. 3 Henry the VII, 1486.

19Holdsworth: Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. 1, p. 409.
0 Stat. 3 Henry the VII, 1486, supra.
21
Stat. 16 Car. 1, 1640.
'Emporor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G. & S. & F. 217, (1867).
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In a case decided by Lord Eldon 23 in which the plaintiff
asked that the defendant be enjoined from publishing libelous
letters, Lord Eldon said, "The publication of a libel is a crime,
and I have no jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of a crime,
excepting such cases as belong to the protection of infantsan exception arising from that peculiar jurisdiction of this
court." However, Lord Eldon granted the injunction on the
ground of the protection of the property right which the writer
of letters has in them. This case is now considered the leading
case on the proposition that equity protects only property rights.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin purprestures
and public nuisances was firmly established in 1795.24
A brief conclusion of this study of the jurisdiction of the
chancellor from early middle ages to the present is that due to
the system of royal justice, the weakness of the government,
the turbulence of the country, and the inability of the law
courts to give adequate relief, the chancellor enjoined many acts
which were criminal and protected persons and property from
violence. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, the council
began to exercise this jurisdiction and left the jurisdiction of
the chancery based on the civil law. The Court of Star Chamber,
established in 1486, assumed the criminal jurisdiction of the
council, and this court was abolished in 1640. Since the fifteenth
century the chancellor has not enjoined crimes except in the
protection of property or in restraint of public nuisances.
The further question of this study is, does the fact that the
criminal law is not enforced furnished sufficient grounds for a
court of equity to interfere and enjoin crimes? It has been
seen that the chancellor until the middle of the fifteenth century
assumed jurisdiction to enjoin criminal acts on the ground that
the defendant's power over the local courts was so great that
he would not or could not be punished through the ordinary
courts. It has been well said in an article on this subject that
this ground of jurisdiction is now obsolete and should not be
revived. "It is not to be presumed that a court of law will fail
to administer justice in cases expressly cognizable by it or that
any department of government will fail in the performance of
25
its duties."
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, (1818).
mAtty. Genl. v. Richards, 2 Anst. 603, (1795).
mBlack: 5 Wis. L. Rev. 19.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down the
rule on that point in the opinion of Mr. Justice Hunt. 26 The
purport of that opinion is that although the remedy at law is
temporarily suspended by means of illegal violence, and the
execution of the law is prevented, by violence or crime, does not
change the fact that the legal remedy is adequate, and the law
courts lose no power and the equity courts gain none.
We conclude that a court of equity is not a court of criminal jurisdiction, and the fact that the law is not enforced and
cannot be enforced is not sufficient grounds for the interference
of a court of equity by use of the injunction.
GORDON B. FiNrzr.
2

aRees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 107, 1873.

